531 P.2d 102
STATE OF KANSAS, Petitioner, v. RONALD W. MAYES, Respondent.
No. 47,445Supreme Court of Kansas
Opinion filed January 25, 1975.
ATTORNEYS — Disbarment From Practicing Law.
Original proceeding in discipline. Opinion filed January 25, 1975. Respondent disbarred.
Michael C. Cavell, special assistant attorney general, argued the cause, and Vern Miller, attorney general, and Curt T. Schneider, assistant attorney general, were with him on the brief for the petitioner.
Ronald W. Mayes, argued the cause, pro se.
Per Curiam:
This is a disciplinary proceeding against Ronald W. Mayes, a member of the bar of this court. The board of law examiners has recommended that the respondent be disbarred. We concur in that recommendation.
The respondent was admitted to practice law in this state in 1965 under our reciprocity rule. He had previously been admitted in the District of Columbia. He established an office in Wichita, where his practice was confined almost exclusively to patent law and related matters. In the spring of 1972 two separate complaints were lodged against him which form the basis of this proceeding. One was by George M. Boyd, the other by Larry Honn. Both are inventors who had employed respondent to file patent applications. While unrelated factually, each complaint generally charged respondent with overzealousness in the pursuit of his fees, neglect of the legal matters entrusted to him, failure to carry out his contract of employment, refusal to consult with his client, and prevarication in such communications as he had.
Respondent filed no written answer to either complaint, but did appear personally before the hearing panel and participated in two days of hearings on May 8 and 9, 1973. The panel submitted its report to the board of law examiners, which amended it and filed it with this court, as amended, on February 20, 1974. Those portions of the amended report containing the board’s findings of fact and conclusions of law as to the two complaints are annexed to this opinion as an appendix and incorporated herein by reference.
On March 25, 1974, respondent filed a “Statement of Exceptions” to the board’s report, in which he took “general exception” to the report. The record was served upon him on April 9, 1974, making his brief due on May 9, 1974 under Rule No. 208 (e) (2). On
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respondent’s successive applications he was granted four separate extensions of time to file his brief until, respectively, June 8, 1974, July 8, 1974, August 15, 1974, and September 15, 1974. Further requests were denied, and respondent filed no brief to support his “exceptions.”
In the meantime respondent filed, at various times from June 19, 1974, through October 22, 1974, thirteen separate “motions to dismiss,” aimed at various specific conclusions of the board as to the Disciplinary Rules that had been violated. These were each overruled, some with leave to renew at the hearing on the merits.
Although by failing to file a brief respondent waived argument on the board’s findings of fact (Rule No. 208 [e] [4]), he nevertheless appeared personally before this court and made a full argument on his own behalf. That argument was addressed largely to factual matters, and he was permitted to exceed the time for argument normally allotted. The court had an opportunity to observe his attitude and demeanor. Before this court respondent was truculent, evasive, unresponsive to the court’s questions, and generally lacking in candor.
There is no need for the court to recount in detail respondent’s dealings with the two complainants; they are contained in the appended report of the board. We have independently examined the 472 page transcript of the hearing and the numerous and voluminous exhibits offered by respondent, and we have re-examined respondent’s various motions to dismiss. We find ample support for the board’s findings and conclusions.
The most serious aspect of the Boyd complaint is that after Boyd’s patent application was filed respondent refused to prepare a response to the patent office’s “action letter” until he was paid fees claimed in the amount of $616.74 — even though failure to file the response in just over thirty days would result in an abandonment of the patent application and a complete loss of the idea Boyd had developed over a period of several years. Boyd and his associates had already paid respondent $2185.00 in fees and expenses; when asked to account for this sum, respondent refused to do so unless paid an additional fee for preparing an itemized statement.
Respondent failed to keep an appointment with Boyd to discuss the matter, and indicated he no longer wished to talk to Boyd. To salvage the work already done Boyd was required to hire other counsel to meet the patent office’s requirements.
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Respondent’s attitude toward his professional responsibility is reflected in the following exchange when he was a witness before the board:
“Q. Well, did you not feel some obligation after undertaking this work to secure the patent?
“A. No My — I’m a contract worker. They pay me to do something, I do it, and that’s it.
“Q. They had already paid you or you had been paid $2,185 from these people?
“A. It has been accounted for. It is contract work. I was paid in advance in those cases for the work I did. For the work I did, I got paid in advance. I got paid my fee for preparing and filing the patent application, and that was it. I have no obligation to them other than what I contracted to do. That is the way the patent business is run, and she’s a toughy.”
We agree with the board’s conclusions that by this conduct respondent neglected the legal matters entrusted to him (DR 6-101 A [3]) and placed his client’s rights in jeopardy (DR 7-101 A [3]). Such conduct was also prejudicial to the administration of justice (DR 1-102 A [5]) and reflected adversely on his fitness to practice law (DR 1-102 A [6]).
By way of defense to this charge respondent asserted, before the board, in his exceptions, and before this court in oral argument, simply that Boyd was not a “client” to whom he owed any duty. The real “client,” he asserted, was the group consisting of Boyd and his two associates, forming some sort of legal entity (which he does not name) distinct from the individuals who comprised it. Hence, he says, he was not required to conduct himself like a lawyer in his dealings with Boyd. We regard the assertion as disingenuous. Boyd was the inventor in whose sole name the patent application was filed, and Boyd individually was the sole addressee and recipient of respondent’s final bill for services. These facts, by themselves, are sufficient to make Boyd a client to whom respondent owed a lawyer’s duty of fidelity and loyalty.
In his dealings with Honn respondent asserted once again his inflexible rule that he did no work until paid in advance. Honn paid him $100 on August 31, 1970, and $900 more on December 15, 1970. The first $400 of this $1,000 was for patentability searches which were in fact performed. Whether the $600 balance was for one patent application, as Honn claimed, or a down payment on a $2,400 fee for four applications, as respondent claimed, is immaterial. The fact remains, and respondent admits, that no applications
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were prepared until more than a year later, in early 1972. In the meantime, in early 1971, Honn’s repeated requests to see respondent’s rough drafts were met by repeated evasions. Respondent assured Honn that the work was progressing, but repeatedly failed to keep appointments with his client. When they did meet, respondent said the files were at home.
Honn despaired of any results, and from March, 1971, until January, 1972, there was no contact at all between respondent and Honn. Then, on January 20, 1972, respondent renewed his contact with Honn. He demanded $1,700 in fees claimed to be due, with interest at 12% per annum from November 23, 1970. Honn’s renewed efforts to see any sign of respondent’s work product met the same fate as those of the previous year. Although respondent concedes the applications were not in existence, he told Honn they were “at home.”
Honn once again gave up, and failed to keep his next appointment with respondent. Respondent, however, and in spite of his rule of “no pay — no work,” proceeded to prepare four patent applications and then sued Honn for $1,700 in fees. In magistrate court the judgment was in favor of Honn. An appeal to district court had been tried and was pending at the time of the hearing before the panel in this proceeding. Since that time judgment was rendered in favor of respondent for the fees claimed. Among respondent’s motions was one to make the journal entry of that judgment a part of the record in this proceeding. Although the motion was overruled at the time it was filed, the journal entry is of record in this proceeding and has been considered by the court in reaching its conclusion herein.
It appears that the judgment in respondent’s favor is based on a lack of evidence in that action (a) that Honn ever formally discharged respondent and (b) that respondent’s services were not reasonably worth $2,700. It amounts to a finding that, based on the law of contracts and the rules of the market place, Honn owes respondent his fees. It does not excuse the year’s delay in attending to the matters entrusted to him (DR 6-101 A [3]) or the failure to carry out his contract of employment within a reasonable time (DR 7-101 A [2]). Neither does it excuse the repeated failure to keep appointments with his client, his failure to communicate with his client for nine months, or his admitted lies as to the progress of his work and its whereabouts. Respondent’s pattern of conduct
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toward his client was unworthy of a member of the bar of this court (DR 1-102 A [6]).
Respondent’s defense to the Honn complaint, as set out in his statement of exceptions, was as follows:
“For emphasis, all matters transacted with Honn was on contract dealing with a patentability search of an invention disclosure and the preparation of four patent applications if sufficient patentable subject matter could be found in the invention disclosure. All of this was strictly within the province of the Patent Office. A registered patent agent could have handled it.”
This is a recurrent theme of respondent’s, running through all of his testimony, motions and argument. He takes the position that as a patent attorney he is bound by different standards of conduct than an ordinary lawyer, and that only patent attorneys are competent to judge him. We reject that contention. As a member of the bar of this court he is bound to observe the Code of Professional Responsibility adopted by this court as Rule No. 501 (214 Kan. lxxv). The canons and rules “voice general standards of behavior required of members of the legal profession and define a level of conduct below which no attorney may fall without making himself liable to disciplinary action.” (Ibid.) See State v. Alvey, 215 Kan. 460, 463-4, 524 P.2d 747. Respondent cannot evade his responsibility to this court, to the bar and to the public, by asserting that he was performing services which could lawfully be performed by a non-lawyer. Se State v. Schumacher, 214 Kan. 1, 10-11, 14-17, 519 P.2d 1116.
Finally, the board found that respondent’s conduct at the hearing before its panel violated numerous Disciplinary Rules, listed in its summary. While the board’s discussion of these infractions is omitted from the appendix, our examination of the record reveals that the board’s findings are fully justified. Respondent’s attitude toward these proceedings is reflected in the following excerpt from his exceptions:
“Respondent also herewith elects to put in issue and does put in issue the qualifications and ethics as attorneys and where applicable the judicial code of ethics of the judiciary of all members of the Kansas Bar and especially the prosecuting attorney for the State of Kansas in this case, the three Law Examiners in this case and the members sitting on the Kansas Supreme Court, in the matters of the report and the complaints, and the related activities of parties preliminary thereto.”
Similar unwarranted aspersions on the integrity of the attorney general and his assistants, the board of law examiners, and the bench and bar abound in the record. Without regard to whether
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this conduct would be grounds for discipline standing alone, we have considered it as relevant to the disposition of the violations charged and proven under the two complaints.
We agree with the board that respondent “is guilty of disregarding the duties of honesty, fidelity, candor and fairness he owes to his clients, the complainants herein, and that he is an unsafe person to manage the legal affairs of others.”
The respondent is disbarred.
APPENDIX
REPORT, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
OF HEARING PANEL
THE COMPLAINT OF LARRY HONN
LARRY HONN, hereinafter referred to as Honn, complains
generally that he hired respondent, RONALD W. MAYES, hereinafter
called Mayes to cause a patent search to be conducted on four
ideas or inventions, and, later, to prepare a patent application
on the most promising one of the ideas; that although he paid a
total of $1,000.00 (representing $400.00 for the patent searches
and the $600.00 fee for one (1) patent application) he was not
shown the application until sued by Mayes about a year and
one-half later in the Court of Common Pleas of Sedgwick County
for an additional fee; that while he made several trips to Mayes’
office to see the application, when he arrived it was always at
Mayes’ home or Mayes did not keep the appointments, all as set
out in his complaint, a copy of which is attached hereto marked
“Complainant’s Exhibit 1” and made a part hereof.
Mr. Mayes did not file a written answer to the complaint, but,
as gleaned from his testimony, he claims that there was initially
an oral agreement between he and Honn to conduct a patent search
on Honn’s ideas and that Honn would be charged $100.00 for each
search made by the professional searcher in Washington, D.C.;
that only three (3) such searches were made; that when the search
report was received and the matter discussed with Honn an
agreement was made wherein Honn agreed to pay $2400.00 for four
(4) patent applications; that Honn paid $100.00 at the initial
office conference on August 31, 1970, and $900.00 on December 15,
1970; that the total payment represented payment of $300.00 on
the
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searches and $700.00 to apply on his fee of $2400.00; that Honn
promised to pay the balance of $1700.00 owing to him but never
did; that Honn had been told that his total fee was due in
advance.
After hearing all evidence and taking the matter under
advisement the Panel finds as follows:
That on August 31, 1970, Mayes and Honn had their initial
conference in Mayes’ office and discussed Honn’s ideas or
inventions; that Honn had three (3) ideas he presented to Mayes
and as a result of their conversations a fourth idea developed;
that Honn authorized Mayes to conduct a patent search of the
information disclosed in the four (4) ideas; that Honn paid
$100.00 to Mayes at the initial conference and agreed to pay
$100.00 for each search made by the professional searcher in
Washington, D.C. (hereinafter called Halpert); that Mayes told
Honn that four (4) searches would be run. During this conference
Mayes told Honn that in preparing a patent application he would
prepare a rough draft and then he and Honn would go over it,
correct it, and keep making rough drafts until they got it right;
that several telephone and office conferences were had between
Mayes and Honn during the time the searches were being made, both
to discuss the progress of the searches and to discuss details of
the ideas.
That on October 23, 1970, an office conference was had between
Mayes and Honn during which they discussed the results of the
patent search; that Halpert had conducted the patent search in
Washington, D.C. in the Patent Office, and had made his report by
letter to Mayes, enclosing copies of several patents touching on
or relating to Honn’s ideas; that the letter report of Halpert
was not shown to Honn but the enclosed patents were reviewed by
Honn and copies of some of them made in Mayes’ office and given
to Honn during the conference.
That during the October 23, 1970 conference Mayes told Honn
that all four ideas were patentable in his opinion; that at this
and subsequent conferences Mayes told Honn that it would be
easier to prepare all four applications at the same time; that an
attorney’s fee of $600.00 per patent application was quoted to
Honn; that a copy of a statement from Mayes to Honn dated October
20, 1972, indicating that charge is attached hereto marked
“Respondent’s Exhibit A” and made a part hereof; that Honn told
Mayes that he did not have the money for all four applications
and he wanted to work with Mayes on a cash basis only; Honn
authorized and agreed to
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pay for preparation of one (1) patent application and promised to
pay the $600.00 attorney’s fee and the balance of the search fee
at a later date.
On December 15, 1970, Honn paid $900.00 to Mayes; that it was
represented to Honn, and he understood, that this amount
represented a $300.00 balance on patent searches of four ideas
and the agreed fee of $600.00 for preparation of one patent
application; that thereafter several office and telephonic
conferences were had between Honn and Mayes during January,
February and March of 1971 concerning technical details of the
application and inquiries concerning the status of the
preparation of the application; that Mayes told Honn the matter
was coming along; that during the months of January, February and
March of 1971, Mayes told Honn that the application was prepared
and made appointments to see Honn in his office; that when Honn
came to the office, Mayes would either (1) not keep the
appointment (be out of the office); or (2) state that the
applications were left at home; that this happened about six or
eight times altogether; that each time Honn would travel from his
home in Great Bend (and later, Sedgwick) to Wichita.
That some time during the period of January, February and March
of 1971 Mayes sent Honn a letter demanding payment of $1700.00
and enclosed a promissory note for that amount; that the note
called for interest at 1% per month on the unpaid balance until
paid; that Honn threw the note and letter in the waste basket;
that Honn determined that since he had received nothing for his
money and was not able to see the rough draft of the application
that he was wasting his time and determined to drop the entire
matter; that he did not communicate that decision to Mayes.
In the ensuing months of the year 1971 there was no contact
between Mayes and Honn; that in January of 1972 Mayes attempted
to and did regain contact with Honn, discovering that Honn had,
during the interim, moved to the City of Sedgwick, Kansas; that
Mayes made demand for the attorney’s fees of $1700.00 plus
interest at 1% per month from November 23, 1970; that a copy of
his letter to Honn, dated January 20, 1972, is attached hereto
marked “Respondent Exhibit D” and made a part hereof; that Honn
again attempted to see the patent applications which Mayes stated
were prepared and went to Mayes’ office; that Mayes again stated
the application was at home; that another office appointment was
made to go over the applications which Honn did not keep.
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That in a subsequent conversation on the telephone Honn finally
told Mayes he considered he was wasting his time and told Mayes
not to do anything further on the matter; that he hadn’t received
anything for his money and was not going to pay any more money.
The panel further finds that Mayes finally prepared four (4)
documents, which he stated were the technical parts of the four
(4) applications; that these were not prepared until after Honn
told Mayes he would not pay any more money and not to do any more
work on the matter; that they were prepared sometime between
January 20, 1972 and March 9, 1972; that they were prepared
incident to a lawsuit against Honn for the recovery of the fees
Mayes claimed Honn owed him; that these applications were not
shown to Honn until the trial in the Court of Common Pleas.
That in April of 1972 Mayes sued Honn in the Court of Common
Pleas for the recovery of the fees and interest at the rate of
12% per annum; that a copy of the Bill of Particulars is attached
hereto marked “Complainant’s Exhibit 2” and made a part hereof;
and, upon trial of the matter, the Judge of the Court of Common
Pleas found against Mayes; that the matter was appealed by Mayes
to the District Court of Sedgwick County; that at the time of the
hearing before this panel the matter had been tried in the
District Court and was under advisement.
That Honn made demand for the return of his papers and the
application which Mayes had indicated was prepared but that Mayes
refused to turn the documents over to Honn.
DISCUSSION
It should be clear at the outset that the panel’s findings,
discussions and conclusions in this matter relate only to Mr.
Mayes’ conduct as an attorney and not as a patent attorney. Mr.
Mayes correctly points out that none of the panel members are
patent attorneys and while evidence was received (including
expert testimony) relating to patent procedures, patent
terminology, interpretations of the four patent applications
prepared by Mayes and whether or not they were or were not in
fact Honn’s ideas and related matters, the panel makes no
findings on these matters and does not draw any conclusions
therefrom.
The record is abundantly clear that Mayes had agreed to prepare
one application for a fee of $600.00, but he refused to do so
until he received additional monies which Honn had not agreed to
pay.
Little weight can be given to Mr. Mayes’ testimony because of
the
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inconsistency of his statements — Mr. Mayes himself stated a fee
of $600.00 per application was quoted but insists this was on the
basis of preparing four applications. The $600.00 per application
fee with no reference to the number of applications is stated in
Respondent’s own exhibits (Respondent’s Exhibit A). While Mayes
on the one hand maintains there was an agreement in October and
November of 1970 for a total fee of $2400.00 for four (4)
applications, he later contradicts himself stating that until he
had thoroughly gone over the search material from Halpert and
information received from Honn he did not know how many
applications he would have had patentable subject matter for;
that he did not know until January or February of 1971 whether he
had sufficient information for four applications and that it
would have been impossible for him to have entered into an
agreement in October of 1970 that four (4) applications would be
filed. He was therefore unable to determine in October or
November of 1970 what the precise fee would be.
It is likewise difficult for the panel to accept Mr. Mayes’
testimony concerning the preparation of the applications. He
maintains on the one hand that he does not do work until he is
paid, but that notwithstanding this practice he does ultimately
prepare the four applications nearly fifteen months after he last
received money from Honn and even though he was not paid for all
four. Mr. Mayes states:
“When you make a deal with a man, you’ve got to
carry your end of the bargain, but if you know you’re
not going to get paid, what are you supposed to do?
Well, I didn’t know I wasn’t going to get paid. Well,
I was supposed to mitigate damages in this case. If
he would have been honest with me in 1971 he might
have gotten off with the thousand dollars, but he
strung me, he really strung me. Now I know the law
and I know all the options on this thing. But I have
the problem with other clients, when we have a
problem, what do I do? Do I go ahead and work my head
off and put in hundreds of hours and hope to come up
with what he agreed to pay me? Or do I throw the
whole thing in the wastepaper basket and forget the
whole thing?” (T-343).
Mayes answers his own question in other parts of the transcript
and among others, at T-332
“. . . he (sic Honn) said `How is the work coming
along?’ I said, `You get the work when I get paid.’
It was like it was agreed. He said, `Well, I’m in
your office now. Let’s see what you’ve done.’ He was
a very aggressive individual and I said `It’s at
home’.”
Notwithstanding his practice of not doing the work until he’s
paid, it was Mayes who renewed contact with Honn in 1972; it was
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Mayes who prepared applications long after there was ample
indication he would get no more money until Honn had seen the
first application in rough draft form.
The conclusion is inescapable that the applications were not
prepared incident to his employment by Honn, but were prepared to
support his lawsuit.
Mr. Mayes’ position is made further unclear by his statement:
“You see, and once I’ve taken a deposit, I’m
obligated to carry it through and that is my
conclusion in this case.” (T-343)
The panel agrees with Mr. Mayes’ conclusion. He was obligated
to carry through — but he didn’t. It is clear that in this
respect Mr. Mayes violated DR 6-101 A (3) in that he neglected a
matter entrusted to him; and DR 7-101 A (2) in that he failed to
carry out a contract of employment entered into with a client for
professional services.
When Mayes told Honn the applications were prepared, and, at
other times, were at home, Mayes violated DR 7-102 A (5) in that
he knowingly made a false statement of fact since at the time
such statements were made the applications had not been prepared.
The panel further finds that Mayes refused to deliver the
applications and papers of the client although the client
requested them, all in violation of DR 9-102 B (4).
When he charged interest at the rate of 1% per month on alleged
unpaid balance of his fee Mr. Mayes violated the provisions of
K.S.A. Supp. 16-508 and DR 2-106 A in that he charged an illegal
rate of interest on his fee.
COMPLAINT OF GEORGE M. BOYD
George M. Boyd, hereinafter called “Boyd”, complains generally
that respondent procrastinated in handling his patent matters,
refused to continue processing his patent application,
jeopardized his patent rights, refused to provide an accounting
for the charges respondent made, and refused to meet with him and
discuss the billing. Mr. Boyd additionally complains of the
manner in which a corporation set up by Mayes for Boyd and others
was not a sound business and proper safeguards were not included,
all as set out in his complaint, a copy of which is attached
hereto marked “Boyd Compl. Exh. 1” and made a part hereof.
Mayes did not file an answer to the complaint with the Board.
Mayes’ position, as gleaned from his testimony, generally was
that he was hired by the corporation, paid by the corporation and
dealt
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with Mr. Simpson. That he was a contract worker who didn’t work
until he was paid and that he was not paid the final bills; that
he was holding Boyd’s papers on the second patent application
until he was paid and refused to perform any more work until he
was paid.
After hearing all the evidence, and taking the matter under
advisement, the panel finds as follows:
That there is insufficient evidence upon which to sustain a
complaint of misconduct on Mayes’ part in connection with the
forming or operation of the Corporation.
Boyd, a retired Major in the U.S. Air Force, developed an idea
called “Dial-A-Base” while in the Air Force as a radar officer,
which device or idea was a navigational aid for use by pilots and
navigators. Boyd had been a Radar Officer in the Air Force and
was knowledgeable in navigation. He had offered the idea to the
Air Force and they had told him to patent it himself.
The idea was a device that portrays the academic information in
the cockpit in a precise way, shows the distance and heading from
one position to another, pre-plotted in circular chart form, and
contains other precise aviation information related to the same
area. It is a map and a new map concept.
That Boyd discussed the idea with Lee DeMoss and Wayne Simpson,
advertising men, who suggested forming a corporation to exploit
the commercial potential of the idea.
That the three men contacted Mayes in the early part of 1970 to
form a corporation and get the idea patented. That Articles of
Incorporation for Boyd-Simpson-DeMoss, Inc. were prepared and
filed with the Secretary of State on April 17, 1970. That on
March 23, 1970, Mayes was paid $400.00 for his work in
incorporating Boyd-Simpson-DeMoss, Inc.
That on February 6, 1970, DeMoss and Associates paid $100.00 to
Mayes to cause a search to be conducted in the U.S. Patent Office
relating to the idea. The patent was to become a part of the
corporate assets.
That Boyd discussed the results of the search with Mayes and
Mayes was authorized to prepare a patent application on the
navigational aid. That Mayes was paid $600.00 on March 19, 1970,
for preparation of a patent application. That subsequently Mayes
and Boyd conferred and ultimately went over a rough draft of the
application. That on July 30, 1970, the final patent application
was
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prepared and sent to the Patent Office for filing. That a check
in the amount of $275.00 dated July 29, 1970, drawn on the
Boyd-Simpson-DeMoss corporate account, was issued to Mayes for
the patent application filing fee. That on July 29, 1970, Mayes
was paid an additional $800.00 drawn on the account of DeMoss
Associates for legal fees but Boyd did not know what work these
fees represented.
That part of the fees paid Mayes were paid by DeMoss
Associates, a business entity with which Boyd was not connected.
That while Boyd was on active duty with the Air Force, Simpson
was the chief executive officer for Boyd-Simpson-DeMoss, Inc.,
and conducted many of the affairs with Mayes. Simpson was also
connected with DeMoss Associates. While Mr. Simpson did not
testify, it was agreed that Mayes might secure an affidavit from
Simpson and submit it as a part of the record (and if the
Attorney General so desired, Simpson’s deposition would be taken
to afford the Attorney General an opportunity to cross-examine).
No such affidavit has been filed by Mayes and he is presumed to
have waived this privilege.
On November 5, 1971, Boyd, as president of Boyd-Simpson-DeMoss,
Inc., wrote Mayes a letter, the original of which is attached
hereto marked Exhibit “3” and made a part hereof, terminating
Mayes’ services as the full-time corporate attorney of
Boyd-Simpson-DeMoss, Inc. and requested Mayes to forward all
papers belonging to the corporation to the corporate address,
1009 East Second Street, Wichita, Kansas.
Mayes and Boyd had several conferences by phone and in the
office during November and December of 1971 and January of 1972.
On November 30, 1971, Mayes claims he sent a letter to Boyd at
the above corporate address enclosing the original corporate
papers and claims that attached to that letter was a detailed
statement of Mayes’ fees and expenses for his services. A copy of
this letter and statement is attached to this report marked “Boyd
Respondent Exh. B 5-9-73” and made a part hereof. This statement
shows a balance due Mayes of $594.24. Boyd claims he received no
such statement.
Boyd did receive Mayes’ letter of January 18, 1972, which is
attached hereto marked “Boyd. Comp. Exh. No. 2,5-9-73” and made a
part hereof. This letter notified Boyd:
“Enclosed is my statement in the amount of $616.74.
Your pending United States patent application SN
59,634 entitled “Navigation Aid” will be held
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abandoned unless a complete response is filed in the
U.S. Patent Office on or before February 22, 1972, to
the Office Action dated November 22, 1971. My fees
are payable in advance and the enclosed statement
must be paid up to date in time to permit me to
prepare the proper response to the U.S. Patent
Office.”
In December of 1970 and January and February of 1971 Boyd
contacted Mayes saying he never received any statements of
accounting of Mayes’ fees and expenses and tried to get Mayes to
give him an accounting. An appointment was made for Boyd to meet
with Mayes to discuss the matter but Mayes didn’t keep the
appointment. Boyd waited for over an hour for Mayes to show up.
Boyd testified that later he called Mayes and Mayes told him.
“. . . I remember specifically he had been out
shopping and he said `Well, I don’t want to talk
about that anymore, and I don’t want to see you any
more’ and that was the end of it.”
That on February 2, 1972, Boyd wrote Mayes a letter, the original
of which is attached hereto marked “Boyd Compl. Exhibit # 4,
5-9-73” and made a part hereof, in which Boyd stated:
“. . . We have asked for a complete accounting of
your services and you have determined that this is an
additional cost to us. Apparently you believe that
you have sent an itemized billing to us. Our records
do not indicate your billing. Another point which
might have contributed to our misunderstanding is
that work accomplished by your firm for BSDI is work
accomplished for George M. Boyd. BSDI and George M.
Boyd are one and the same in this matter.
In view of the above, we no longer need your
services as either our corporate attorney or our
patent attorney. Sufficient money has already been
paid to you for the patent protection required.
Please forward all records and patent applications
with the appropriate Patent Office correspondence to
me regardless of their state of completion without
further delay. Not later than 3 February, 1972.”
Mayes did not return those requested documents.
In the several times that Boyd talked to Mayes concerning an
accounting, Mayes agreed to provide an accounting but stated he
would have to go back through his records and would have to
charge Boyd for the work.
Mayes testified that the $600.00 received by him on March 19,
1970, was a deposit to apply on the cost of the first patent
application but that this was later switched to a deposit to
apply on preparation of a second patent application; that the
cost of the first application was $1,085.00 including the filing
fee. This was paid by the two checks dated July 29, 1970; that
the $616.74 additional fee owed to him included a $200.00 charge
to prepare the response to the patent office Action Letter and
other expenses in connection
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with the corporation and other matters as related in his letter
of November 30, 1971, to Boyd (Respondent’s Exhibit “B”).
That Mayes told Boyd he was prepared to provide him with a
final draft of the second patent application when he was
guaranteed by someone that he would be paid.
That notwithstanding the February 22, 1972, deadline by which a
response to the Patent Office Action Letter must be filed or the
application would be considered abandoned, Mayes testified:
“Q: Now, you were here when Mr. Ryan was testifying
as to what was necessary to complete the application
or complete the work to secure the patent on this
invention of Mr. Boyd’s. Now, is his testimony
correct that if something was not done on or about
February 22 there was a very real possibility that
the patent would be abandoned? He would never be able
to patent this invention?
A: It is not a possibility. It is a fact. It would
be held abandoned unless a complete response was
filed by the declared deadline unless, of course, you
asked and got an extension.
Q: Well, did you not feel some obligation after
undertaking this work to secure the patent?
A: No. My — I’m a contract worker. They pay me to
do something, I do it, and that’s it.
Q: They had already paid you or you had been paid
$2,185.00 from these people?
A: It has been accounted for. It is contract work.
I was paid in advance in those cases for the work I
did. For the work I did, I got paid in advance. I got
paid my fee for preparing and filing the patent
application, and that was it. I have no obligation to
them other then what I contracted to do. That is the
way the patent business is run, and she’s a toughy.”
(T-429, 430)
DISCUSSION
Mr. Mayes’ conduct as illustrated by the record exhibits an
appalling lack of communication with his client, Boyd, and his
client, Honn, and an absolute refusal to talk to Boyd after the
February, 1972, telephone call. Mayes did not keep the last
appointment with Boyd but did not cancel the appointment either
leaving Boyd waiting for an hour. Mayes refused to give an
accounting of his fees and expenses although by his own testimony
he would only have had to copy Respondent’s Exhibit “B” and mail
it to Boyd. He accuses his clients of being tricky, lying and of
not paying him for his work.
While Mayes on the one hand recognizes that once he’s taken a
deposit he has an obligation to his client to carry the matter
through; he then feels no obligation to protect his client,
Boyd’s valuable property, and prevent its being held abandoned by
failure
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to file a response to the Patent Office Action Letter (until he
is paid $200.00 in advance).
CONCLUSION
The panel concludes that Mr. Mayes has violated the following
disciplinary rules with respect to the Boyd complaint:
DR 1-102 A (5) in that he engaged in conduct that
was prejudicial to the administration of justice;
DR 1-102 A (6) in that he engaged in conduct that
adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law;
DR 6-101(A)(3) in that he neglected legal matters
entrusted to him;
DR 7-101 A (3) in that he placed his client’s
property rights in jeopardy during the course of his
representation of the client.
SUMMARY
It is therefore the conclusion of the Panel that Mr. Mayes has
violated the following rules of Professional Responsibility:
DR 6-101 A (3); DR 7-101 A (2); DR 7-102 A (5);
DR 9-102 B (4) and DR 2-106 A
in respect to the HONN COMPLAINT;
DR 1-102 A (5); DR 1-102 A (6); DR 6-101 A (3)
DR 7-101 A (3)
with respect to the BOYD COMPLAINT.
It is further the conclusion of the Panel that in his conduct at
the time of the hearing and his testimony therein, Mr. Mayes has
violated:
DR 6-101 A (2); DR 7-106 C (1); DR 7-106 C (2);
DR 7-106 C (3); DR 7-106 C (4); DR 7-106 C (6);
DR 7-106 C (7); DR 1-102 A (5); DR 1-102 A (6)
and DR 9-102 A (2);
and the Panel specifically finds that the respondent, RONALD
WAYNE MAYES, is guilty of disregarding the duties of honesty,
fidelity, candor and fairness he owes to his clients, the
complainants herein, and that he is an unsafe person to manage
the legal affairs of others.
The panel, therefore, recommends that RONALD WAYNE MAYES be
disciplined by DISBARMENT.
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